혼합 문자 체계 감지
서로 다른 문자 체계의 문자를 혼합하는 텍스트를 식별합니다(예: 라틴 + 키릴). 동형이자 공격에 대한 주요 방어 수단으로, 브라우저는 이를 사용하여 Punycode 표시를 트리거합니다.
What is Mixed-Script Detection?
Mixed-script detection is a security technique that identifies text strings containing characters from more than one Unicode script, flagging them as potentially deceptive. Because legitimate text in most contexts is written in a single script — English in Latin, Russian in Cyrillic, Arabic in the Arabic script — the presence of multiple scripts in a single identifier, domain name, or username is a strong signal of a spoofing attempt.
Unicode Technical Report #39 (Unicode Security Mechanisms) formalizes mixed-script detection as one of the primary defenses against homoglyph and confusable attacks.
Unicode Scripts
Unicode organizes characters into scripts — named systems of writing associated with particular languages and cultures. Every Unicode character (except a small set of "Common" and "Inherited" script characters) belongs to exactly one script. The Unicode Character Database includes a Scripts.txt property file assigning each code point to its script.
Examples of scripts: Latin, Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian, Hebrew, Arabic, Devanagari, Bengali, CJK (Han), Hiragana, Katakana, Thai, Georgian.
A handful of characters — digits (0–9), punctuation like ., -, @ — have script property Common and are allowed in any script context without triggering mixed-script detection.
How Mixed-Script Detection Works
The algorithm examines all characters in a string and collects the set of scripts represented:
- Characters with script Common or Inherited are ignored for mixing purposes
- Characters with a specific script (Latin, Cyrillic, etc.) are added to the script set
- If the resulting set contains more than one script, the string is mixed-script
For example:
paypal— all Latin — single script, cleanраураl— Cyrillic р, а, у, р, а + Latin l — mixed script, flaggedmünchen— Latin + Common (no mixing concern) — single script, cleanаррlе— Cyrillic а, р, р + Latin l, е — mixed script, flagged
Augmented Script Sets
Unicode TR39 defines the concept of augmented script sets to handle characters that are legitimately used across scripts. For example, Han characters are used in both Japanese (combined with Hiragana and Katakana) and Chinese. The augmented script sets expand the "allowed combinations" to prevent false positives for legitimate multilingual text such as Japanese.
This means Japanese text containing Hiragana, Katakana, and Han characters is not flagged as mixed-script because all three are in Japan's augmented script set. Only truly suspicious combinations — Latin mixed with Cyrillic, for example — trigger the detection.
Spoof Checks Defined in TR39
Unicode TR39 defines four formal spoof check levels:
- Single-script confusable: A single-script string that is confusable with another single-script string (e.g., all-Cyrillic lookalike of a Latin word)
- Mixed-script confusable: A string mixing scripts where replacing characters would produce a confusable string in a single script
- Whole-script confusable: An entire string in script X that is confusable with a string in script Y
- Any-case confusable: The above checks applied case-insensitively
Implementation in Practice
Browser implementations use mixed-script detection to decide whether to display an internationalized domain name as Unicode or fall back to Punycode. Domain registrars apply it to block registration of mixed-script domains. Programming language toolchains use it to warn about suspicious identifiers.
Python 3 uses a variant of this check for source code identifiers. The unicodedata module exposes script information, and third-party libraries like confusable-homoglyphs implement full TR39 checks.
Quick Facts
| Property | Value |
|---|---|
| Governing standard | Unicode TR39 — Unicode Security Mechanisms |
| Script data file | Scripts.txt in Unicode Character Database |
| Special script values | Common, Inherited (excluded from mixing checks) |
| Japanese exception | Han + Hiragana + Katakana allowed via augmented sets |
| Primary defense against | IDN homograph attacks, username spoofing |
| Browser application | Determines Unicode vs. Punycode URL rendering |
| Related concept | Whole-script confusable, confusables dataset |
관련 용어
보안의 더 많은 용어
Exploiting Unicode bidirectional control characters to disguise malicious code or filenames. The …
도메인 이름에 시각적으로 유사한 유니코드 문자를 사용하여 합법적인 사이트를 사칭하는 공격. аpple.com(키릴 …
Exploiting Unicode normalization to bypass security filters. Input validated before normalization may …
U+200D. 인접 문자의 결합을 요청합니다. 이모지 시퀀스에 필수적입니다(👩+ZWJ+💻=👩💻). 인도 문자에서는 합자 형성을 …
U+200C. 인접 문자의 결합을 방지합니다. 페르시아어/아랍어에서 올바른 글자 형태를 위해 필수적이며, 데바나가리에서 …
서로 다른 문자 체계에서 동일하거나 매우 유사하게 보이는 문자. 예: 라틴 'a'와 …
유니코드 양방향 재정의 문자(U+202A~U+202E, U+2066~U+2069)를 사용하여 악성 파일 이름이나 코드를 위장하는 공격. …
유니코드 기능을 사용하여 사용자를 속이는 것: 가짜 도메인을 위한 동형이자, 가짜 파일 …
confusables.txt(UCD)에 정의된 시각적으로 혼동될 수 있는 문자 쌍에 대한 유니코드 공식 용어. …